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harm. It is further suggested that a standing doctrine which re-
quires the claimant to establish only "injury in fact" rather than
"special injury" will be adequate to eliminate frivolous claims of
environmental injury while ensuring that clear violations of
SEQRA do not go unpoliced. New York claimants, especially those
with economic interests at stake, who have suffered environmental
harm but cannot demonstrate special injury, may not be able to
challenge the agency action causing this harm. As a practical mat-
ter, environmental groups intending to challenge agency actions
must be careful to identify members who have suffered special
injury.5
Christopher P. Malloy
New York Court of Appeals holds that court may look beyond
four corners of complaint to determine insurance company's duty
to defend
Traditionally, when determining the sufficiency of pleadings
on a motion to dismiss,' New York courts examine the allegations
set forth within the "four corners of the complaint."2 As long as
allegations in the complaint state a valid cause of action, the mo-
tion to dismiss will fail.3 Similarly, an insurer's obligation to de-
" Implementation of the Suffolk Lantz Plastics Law is expected to begin early in 1992.
See John Barbanel, Suffolk County's Ban on Plastics Loses Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1991, at Al. The decision to implement the law was made despite requests from the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation to delay enforcement of the law
pending a study of its potential impact on Long Island's garbage disposal pollutants. Id.
Environmentalists and plastics industry representatives alike question whether the law will
have a positive impact on Suffolk's solid waste disposal problems, and small business owners
and supermarket chains are concerned about the law's potential adverse affects on the econ-
omy. Id.
1 See CPLR 3211 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1991); see also SIEGEL §§ 257-258, at 387-89
(discussing motion to dismiss for failure to state cause of action); 4 WK&M 1 3211.29
(same).
2 See, e.g., Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 372 N.E.2d 17, 20, 401
N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (1977) (stating that sole determining factor in deciding motion to dismiss
is whether allegations in complaint state cause of action); Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60,
64-65, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 126-27 (lst Dep't 1964) (same).
' See Meyers & Sons Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.2d 298, 302, 545 N.E.2d
1206, 1208, 546 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1989); Guggenheimer, 43 N.Y.2d at 275, 372 N.E.2d at
20, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 185. In Guggenheimer, the Court of Appeals explained that "[ilnitially,
the sole criterion [in determining whether a motion to dismiss should be granted] is whether
the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are
discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for
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fend its insured arises whenever the pleadings allege the occur-
rence of a covered event,4 regardless of facts known to the insurer
that may render the claim meritless.5 Conversely, insurers have ar-
dismissal will fail." Id. In Pace v. Perk, 81 A.D.2d 444, 449, 440 N.Y.S.2d 710, 714 (2d Dep't
1981), the Appellate Division, Second Department stated the following:
[Tihe court [in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim] must
assume that its allegations are true, and must deem the complaint to allege
whatever can be imputed from its statements by fair and reasonable intendment,
however imperfectly, informally or illogically facts may be stated therein. In mak-
ing its analysis, the court is not bound by the constructions and theories of the
parties. The test of the sufficiency of a complaint is whether it gives sufficient
notice of the transactions, [or] occurrences.., intended to be proved and whether
the requisite elements of any cause of action known to our law can be discerned
from its averments.
Id. (citations omitted).
' See Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 73, 542
N.E.2d 1048, 1050, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (1989) ("If the complaint contains any facts or
allegations which bring the claim even potentially within the protection purchased, the in-
surer is obligated to defend."). See generally 7C JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE §§ 4682-4683 (1979 & Supp. 1991) (discussing basic concepts of duty to defend);
GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 51:42-51:43, at 452-58 (2d ed. 1982)
(same); Deborah M. Neyens, Comment, Expanding the Insurer's Duty to Defend in Iowa:
First Newton National Bank v. General Casualty Company of Wisconsin, 74 IOWA L. REV.
969, 971-73 (1989) (same).
New York courts have further stated that if any doubt exists as to whether the allega-
tions state a claim under the policy, the doubt "must be resolved in favor of the insured."
Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 402, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927, 937 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1975).
1 See Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751 (2d Cir. 1949). See generally
Case Note, An Insurer's Duty to Defend Its Insured and an Insurer's Liability for Wrong-
fully Declining to Defend Its Insured-Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Cos.,
6 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 473, 476-77 (1980) (discussing general principles of insurer's duty
to defend).
Liability policies generally provide that the insurer will defend any suit brought against
the insured even if the suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent. See Ruder & Finn Inc. v.
Seaboard Sur. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 670, 422 N.E.2d 518, 521, 439 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (1981);
Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 151, 77 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1948);
see also Case Note, supra, at 473 n.5 (duty to defend claim within coverage is standard
feature of liability insurance policy). Thus, as stated by the Second Circuit in Lee, an "in-
surer will defend the suit, if the injured party states a claim [covered under the policy]; and
it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information from the insured... which indicates, or
even demonstrates, that the injury is not in fact 'covered.'" Lee, 178 F.2d at 751 (emphasis
added).
Courts have confined their analysis to the allegations contained in the complaint be-
cause of the longstanding principle that an insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty
to indemnify. See Ruder, 52 N.Y.2d at 669, 422 N.E.2d at 521, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 861;
Goldberg, 297 N.Y. at 154, 77 N.E.2d at 133. Consequently, even though an insurer may not
ultimately be obligated to indemnify its insured because it is established at trial that the
event falls outside the coverage of the insurance policy or because it is determined that the
insured is not liable to the injured party, the insurer may still be obligated to defend the
insured party. See Ruder, 52 N.Y.2d at 669-70, 422 N.E.2d at 521, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
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gued that a complaint must be dismissed when it fails to allege
facts placing the event within the scope of coverage of the policy,
notwithstanding facts known to the insurer that would indicate
that the event is covered." Courts in jurisdictions outside of New
York, however, have held that an insurer has a duty to defend
when it has knowledge of facts creating the possibility of coverage
under the policy, regardless of whether the allegations set forth in
the complaint state a valid cause of action.7 Recently, in Fitzpat-
rick v. American Honda Motor Co.,8 the New York Court of Ap-
peals adopted this approach, concluding that an insurer cannot
avoid its duty to defend "when it has actual knowledge of facts
establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage.""
In Fitzpatrick, the plaintiff, Linda Fitzpatrick, sued for the
wrongful death of her husband and named Frank Moramarco, in-
However, at least one court outside of New York has held that an insurer is relieved of
its duty to defend when facts outside the complaint show that the alleged occurrence is not
within the coverage of the policy. See Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 64 N.W.2d
366, 368 (Minn. 1954) ("where the owner himself ... indicated that the incidents com-
plained of were . . .intentional and deliberate ... there was no coverage under the policy
involved").
6 See, e.g., Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127 S.E.2d 53, 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962)
(insurer argued that "because [it was] .. .bound to defend a suit falsely alleging a claim
covered by the policy, [it was therefore] excused from defending a suit alleging facts not
covered, whether false or not"); LaRotunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 408 N.E.2d 928, 934 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980) (insurer sought to deny defense because complaint alleged use of land as
refuse dump, which brought activity within business use exclusion, even though insurer
knew part of land was vacant and not used for business purposes); Lanoue v. Fireman's
Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 50-52 (Minn. 1979) (insurer contended it had no duty
to defend because complaint stated defendant furnished injured party with alcohol and pol-
icy excluded coverage for such an event, even though insurer knew injured party had in fact
stolen alcohol).
' See, e.g., Loftin, 127 S.E.2d at 59 (insurer obligated to defend when facts which are
"known or ascertainable" by it are within coverage); LaRotunda, 408 N.E.2d at 934 (insurer
estopped from denying coverage when facts known by it potentially bring claim within pol-
icy); Lanoue, 278 N.W.2d at 52 (facts outside complaint known by insurer may not be ig-
nored). But see Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 210 A.2d 221, 225 (N.J. 1965) (holding
that duty to defend is based only on allegations in complaint without regard to knowledge of
facts outside pleadings); Consolidated Underwriters v. Loyd W. Richardson Constr. Corp.,
444 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (same).
8 78 N.Y.2d 61, 575 N.E.2d 90, 571 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).
9 Id. at 67, 575 N.E.2d at 93, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 675. Lower New York courts had previ-
ously reached the same conclusion. See Spielfogel v. North River Ins. Co., 148 A.D.2d 696,
697, 539 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (2d Dep't 1989); Commercial Pipe & Supply Corp. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 36 A.D.2d 412, 415, 321 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-22 (4th Dep't 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d
619, 282 N.E.2d 128, 331 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1972) (affirming because complaint established possi-
bility of coverage; knowledge outside complaint was not discussed); Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher
Governor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 402-03, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927, 937 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
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ter alia, as a defendant. 10 Moramarco was characterized in the
complaint as an employee of Cherrywood Property Owners Associ-
ation ("CPOA"), but was in fact an officer, shareholder and direc-
tor of Cherrywood Landscaping, Inc. ("CLI"), an independent con-
cern that had been retained by CPOA to do landscaping work on
CPOA's property." Pursuant to a liability insurance policy CLI
had obtained through National Casualty Company ("National"),
Moramarco requested that National provide the defense in the suit
brought by Fitzpatrick, but National refused the request because
Moramarco was not insured as an individual under the policy.' 2 By
its terms, the policy named as "insured persons" "any executive
officer, director, or stockholder [of the named insured (i.e., CLI)]
while acting within the scope of his duties."'13 Thereafter,
Moramarco filed a third-party complaint against National seeking
to compel a defense, and National moved to dismiss pursuant to
CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7).14 The supreme court denied National's
motion to dismiss, 15 and the appellate division reversed.16
The New York Court of Appeals again reversed, holding that
National had a duty to defend based on its knowledge of facts
outside the complaint establishing a reasonable possibility of cov-
erage, even though the allegations in the Fitzpatrick complaint
'0 Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 63, 575 N.E.2d at 90, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 672. The complaint
alleged that Moramarco had hired Fitzpatrick as an independent contractor and that Fitz-
patrick was killed while using a three-wheel all-terrain vehicle owned by Moramarco. Id. at
63, 575 N.E.2d at 90-91, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 672-73.
1 Id. at 63, 69, 575 N.E.2d at 91, 94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 673, 676.
12 Id. at 64, 575 N.E.2d at 91, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
" Id. Moramarco informed National, in subsequent correspondence, that the vehicle
"was 'owned for and ... used exclusively for landscaping operations' and that the claims
asserted against him in the main action all arose out of activities he undertook for CLI, the
named insured." Id. The court also stated that Moramarco was an officer and/or shareholder
of CLI, and had he been correctly identified in the complaint, he would have been covered.
Id. at 69, 575 N.E.2d at 94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
" Id. at 64, 575 N.E.2d at 91, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 673. National contended that it had no
duty to defend because the allegations in Fitzpatrick's complaint did not imply "that the
claim against Moramarco arose in connection with his activities as an officer, shareholder or
director of the insured CLI." Id. Moramarco submitted proof that the pleading was inaccu-
rate and that the alleged occurrence was covered by the policy. Id.
" Id. The supreme court reasoned that the determination as to whether the allegations
stated a covered event had to be decided at a plenary trial. Id. at 65, 575 N.E.2d at 91, 571
N.Y.S.2d at 673.
"' Id. at 65, 575 N.E.2d at 91, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 673. The appellate division dismissed the
complaint, holding that the "allegations in the complaint are the determinative factor in
resolving whether the provisions of an insurance policy have been 'activated' in a particular
action." Id.
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failed to state a covered event under the policy. 17 Writing for the
majority, Judge Titone explained that the rationale for application
of the "four corners of the complaint" rule is that "the [insurer's]
duty to defend is broader than [its] duty to indemnify,"'Is and that
application of the four-corners approach in cases such as this
would in fact "render the duty to defend narrower than the duty
to indemnify."' 9 The court further reasoned that implementation
of this rule would lead to unjust results since it would provide the
insurer with a windfall by allowing it to hide behind the complaint,
thus denying an insured the benefit of the purchased protection. 0
Dissenting, Judge Alexander asserted that National's argu-
ment should have been accepted because it was in accord with the
long-established rule that the duty to defend is determined by the
allegations set forth in the complaint.21 Judge Alexander argued
that by deviating from the traditional four-corners rule, the court
had replaced "certainty with uncertainty" because an insurer will
not know "what, if any, investigation it must make" to determine
its obligation to defend.22
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals was correct in deter-
mining that National was obligated to defend Moramarco, notwith-
standing Fitzpatrick's failure to characterize Moramarco as a spe-
cifically named insured in the complaint, because to hold otherwise
would lead to unjust results. It is noted, however, that the court in
Fitzpatrick left unanswered the critical question of when and to
what extent an insurance company is now obligated to investigate
a claim before denying a defense.
While it is true that the four-corners approach provides cer-
tainty for both the insured and the insurer,2 application of this
"7 Id. at 70, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
" Id. at 65, 575 N.E.2d at 92, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
19 Id. at 66, 575 N.E.2d at 92, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 69-70, 575 N.E.2d at 94-95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676-77. The court also stated that
its decision in this case was supported by New York's liberal pleading rules. Id. at 69, 575
N.E.2d at 94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676. CPLR 3025(a) provides that the pleadings may be
amended to conform to the proof at any time, provided no prejudice is shown. See CPLR
3025(a) (McKinney 1991).
21 Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 71, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting). Judge Alexander argued that if courts are to hold that a duty to defend arises
when the allegations state a cause of action, then the converse, that no duty exists when the
claim fails to state a covered event, should also be true. Id. at 71-72, 575 N.E.2d at 96, 571
N.Y.S.2d at 678 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 73, 575 N.E.2d at 97, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 679 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
23 See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 326-27,
[Vol. 66:252
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rule in situations where an insurer has knowledge of facts that
would give rise to its duty to defend, yet which are not asserted in
the complaint, would allow insurers to ignore their duty "at the
expense of [the] insured. '24 Generally, these unalleged facts will
surface at trial, and under the CPLR's liberal pleading rules,25 the
complaint can be amended to conform to these facts, thereby stat-
ing a covered claim.26 Based on this rationale, as well as decisions
from other jurisdictions, 27 it is proposed that the Court of Appeals
arrived at a sound result.
However, Judge Alexander's dissent raised a critical question
320 N.E.2d 619, 621-22, 361 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (1974) (under four-corners-of-complaint rule,
when allegations state cause of action covered under policy, insurer knows it will have to
defend and insured understands it will receive defense).
24 Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 69, 575 N.E.2d at 94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676. If the complaint
is deemed controlling, the insurer could cloak itself behind the third party's complaint and
thus improperly limit its duty to defend in circumstances where the insured has not pleaded
facts evidencing coverage, but the insurer has notice of such facts. See id. at 66, 575 N.E.2d
at 92, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 674; see also Associated Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 386
N.E.2d 529, 536 (II1. App. Ct. 1979) (not looking beyond complaint will "allow the insurer to
construct a formal fortress of the third party's pleadings and to retreat behind its walls,
thereby successfully ignoring true but unpleaded facts within its knowledge that require it
-.. to conduct the ... insured's defense").
Under these circumstances, not only would application of the four-corners rule lessen
the insurer's obligation to defend, it would also deny the insured's reasonable expectation of
coverage. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 173 (Cal. 1966) (upholding request for
defense when "insured could reasonably expect [and is legally entitled to] such protection");
Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127 S.E.2d 53, 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). In Loftin, the
court discussed the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage in terms of the intent of
the parties when it stated,
[i]t would not be reasonable to say that it was the intention of the contracting
parties, when the insured has given all notice and information required of him,
that the assertions of a third party, a stranger to the contract, rather than the true
facts, be allowed to determine the rights between the contracting parties ....
Id.; see also Case Note, supra note 5, at 482 n.38 (four-corners test cannot be applied when
known facts outside pleadings contradict allegations and insured's reasonable expectations
of coverage).
25 See SIEGEL §§ 207-209, at 300-04 (noting that pleading under CPLR is liberal); see
also Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60, 63, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dep't 1964) (under
CPLR pleadings give "notice" to court and parties).
28 See Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 69-70, 575 N.E.2d at 94-95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676-77;
CPLR 3025(c) (McKinney 1991) (permitting amendment to conform to evidence). Under
this theory, the fact of Moramarco's position as an officer and/or stockholder of CLI would
have emerged at trial, Fitzpatrick's complaint could have been amended, and National's
true duty to defend would have been exposed. See Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 69-70, 575
N.E.2d at 94-95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676-77.
" See Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 66-67, 575 N.E.2d at 92-93, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 674-75
(surveying cases holding that insurer's knowledge of facts that potentially bring claim within
policy's indemnification coverage gives rise to duty to defend).
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as to what, if any, investigation insurers are now obligated to
make. s The Fitzpatrick court expressly declined to resolve this is-
sue, however, because the insured had notified National of the un-
derlying facts, and therefore the court was not required to discuss
the insurer's duty to investigate.29
Jurisdictions that have adopted this so-called "factual test""0
in determining whether the insurer has a duty to defend have em-
ployed different standards to ascertain the extent of the insurer's
duty to investigate.3 ' It is submitted that New York courts should
adopt a rule that would impose on insurers a duty to discover
those facts that are reasonably ascertainable. Because most insur-
ance policies already entitle the insurer to conduct an investigation
whenever it deems necessary, 2 the proposed standard would not
Id. at 73, 575 N.E.2d at 97, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 679 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 67 n.2, 575 N.E.2d at 93 n.2, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 675 n.2. The court stated, "there
is nothing in this case, where the insurer was actually notified of the salient facts by both its
insured and its own agent, that requires us to create a duty to investigate where none previ-
ously existed." Id.
30 See David S. Garbett, The Duty to Defend Clause in a Liability Insurance Policy:
Should the Exclusive Pleading Test Be Replaced?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 235, 239 (1982)
(defines "factual test" as rule whereby actual facts control duty to defend when complaint
fails to accurately illustrate covered event).
" Some courts have held that the insurer's duty is based on those facts that are known
by the insurer, see LaRotunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 408 N.E.2d 928, 934 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (facts obtained by insurer's investigation can be considered knowledge); New Hamp-
shire Ins. Co. v. Christy, 200 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Iowa 1972) (knowledge from facts of record);
Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn. 1979) (unpleaded facts
relayed to insurance agent by insured constitute knowledge), whereas other courts have held
that an insurer is obligated to defend when facts are known or are reasonably ascertainable.
See National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360, 366 (Alaska 1970) (enunciating duty to
investigate facts but denying coverage because reasonable investigation would not have ex-
posed coverage); Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127 S.E.2d 53, 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962)
(predicating insurer's duty to defend on discovery of reasonably ascertainable facts); Shep-
ard Marine Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 250 N.W.2d 541, 542 (Mich. Ct. App.
1976) (insurer must look beyond third party complaint). See generally APPLEMAN, supra
note 4, § 4684.01, at 95 (discussing insurer's duty to investigate); Garbett, supra note 30, at
284-88 (same).
Those New York courts that employed the factual test adopted by the Court of Appeals
in Fitzpatrick did so because the insurer had actual knowledge of unalleged facts; they did
not impose any duty to investigate on the insurer. See, e.g., Spielfogel v. North River Ins.
Co., 148 A.D.2d 696, 697, 539 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (2d Dep't 1989) (knowledge came from
plaintiff's deposition testimony); Commercial Pipe & Supply Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 36
A.D.2d 412, 415, 321 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (4th Dep't 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 619, 282 N.E.2d
128, 331 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1972) (facts inferred from allegations); Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Gover-
nor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 401, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927, 936 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (allega-
tions of third-party complaint raised possibility of coverage).
11 See APPLEMAN, supra note 4, § 4682, at 22 n.9 (general liability insurance policy
states insurer "may make such investigation ... of any claim or suit as it deems expedi-
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be overly burdensome on insurers and would best protect the in-
terests of the insured.33
When the occurrence of a covered event has been stated in the
complaint, the four-corners approach ensures that an insurer's
duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. However, in
circumstances where the allegations do not state the occurrence of
a covered event, application of the four-corners approach would
yield unjust results because an insurer could dodge its duty to de-
fend despite the existence of facts evidencing the possibility of a
duty to indemnify. Recognizing this risk, the New York Court of
Appeals in Fitzpatrick properly adopted the factual test, which
recognizes the duty to defend when an insurer has knowledge of
facts evidencing the occurrence of a covered event. While the
court's decision should be applauded, it must be recognized that its
failure to address the extent to which an insurer must conduct a
factual investigation will necessitate further consideration of this
issue in the future.
Steven M. Skolnick
ent"); see also WARREN FREEDMAN, FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON INSURANCE § 5A:3, at 526 (6th
ed. 1990) ("It is generally recognized that as long as there is 'potential' coverage of the claim
* * * [t]he burden is on the insurer to conduct a reasonable investigation as to
coverage . . ").
3 See Garbett, supra note 30, at 284 n.219 (imposition of duty to discover reasonably
ascertainable facts would not be burdensome since most insurers will "investigate as a mat-
tar of course to determine the merits of the action against the insured and evaluate settle-
ment prospects").
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